How will the world look in 2030?  It depends on how the United States looks in 2030.

That may be the most important takeaway of the current draft of Global Trends 2030.  Of course, the analytic team has identified many key drivers that will shape global affairs over the next two decades, but perhaps the most important change from previous installments of this quadrennial exercise is the addition of a section devoted to “the role of the United States.”

Previous Global Trends efforts followed too closely the Intelligence Community mandate to look outward rather than inward.  The mandate is a sensible reaction to Cold War abuses when the IC conducted covert collection operations against U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.  But when the task is forecasting global affairs into the future, it is absurd to fence off consideration of the most pivotal factor shaping the future – the trajectory of the sole superpower.

GT 2030 sensibly includes the United States in its analytical purview and does so without crossing any red-lines that would alarm civil libertarians.  But nor does it stretch the analytical envelope to consider radical departures from the current trends.

It assesses two broad scenarios:

• An “optimistic” future in which the United States polity “would address its structural weaknesses” while other powers likewise get their fiscal houses in order.  The result is a graceful relative decline in U.S. power, but one in which online casino the United States is still primus inter pares and doing very well, thank you very much.

• A “pessimistic” scenario casino pa natet in which the U.S. economy does not rebound, online pokies resulting in a U.S. that is neither inclined nor capable casino online of leading.  No actor with global reach steps into the power vacuum, but regional hegemons (China) do and the result is a world split into hostile alliances, a la the 1930’s.

GT 2030 hedges, but seems to bet on the optimistic future.  This is not the straight-line inertial path of the last several months, but dgfev online casino it is fully in keeping with the old maxim that those who have bet on U.S. collapse have, in the long run, tended to lose their shirts.

But what if the outcomes we get are further in the tails There is no cost and no obligation!You can also sign up for monthly credit rating scale reports to track your credit rating scale history and make sure it’s accurate. of the distribution?  For instance, what if the United States rebounds, but Europe casino online and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) implode?  It is not too hard to make U.S. problems pale in comparison to the challenges faced by the Eurozone and the BRICs (and to this artificial grouping, I would add the other medium-sized powers competing for regional influence but all facing domestic hurdles at least as daunting as the ones faced in Washington: Turkey, Nigeria, South Africa, Japan, and perhaps Indonesia).  Of course, if all of the other parts of the global economy suffer, the U.S. economy will suffer, too.  But isn’t at least theoretically possible that the relative power gap between the U.S. and the rest might actually widen over the next 15 years?  What would that world look like?

Or what about an outcome in the tail on the opposite side: the U.S. collapses, but an actor with global reach (presumably China, but perhaps a Europe arising phoenix-like out of its current fiscal/monetary crisis)?  Or what if the actor with global reach is, in fact, some sort of global governance scheme that supersedes national sovereignty? None of these variants seems nearly as likely as the others, but it would be worth pondering their impact.

Previous Global Trends products tended to guess correctly at the trajectory of global affairs while underestimating the speed with which we would move in that direction.  That would be good news for us in this case, since GT 2030 seems to predict a U.S. role that most Americans could accept.  What if this time they have missed the trajectory, and we are heading in a very different direction?

The World Bank released a report earlier this year warning that China is at risk of falling into the “middle income trap” of much slower or stagnant growth unless it implements a sweeping economic reform agenda. The export- and investment-led industrializing model that has served China so well over the past decade will not perform as well over the next twenty years.  The viability of this model will be undermined by slowing export growth, a shrinking urban workforce, rising costs for energy, water, and other inputs, and overcapacity caused by years of overinvestment.   The 468-page report, “China 2030”, identifies a variety of reform areas that Beijing must focus on to promote  China’s long-term economic development and improve the odds that it will eventually attain high-income status.  These include reducing the role of government in the economy, reforming and restructuring state enterprises and banks, developing the private sector, promoting competition in the land, labor and financial markets, and accelerating the pace of innovation.

There are signs that Chinese leaders foresee these challenges and recognize the need for structural reform.  For several years Beijing has focused its economic planning on “rebalancing” the economy away from exports and investment toward household consumption.  Beijing has also strongly emphasized science and technology (S&T) as a new economic growth driver, devoting a larger share of its GDP to research and development than do other countries with similar income levels.   This might give China a  better chance of sustaining productivity growth even as the [ 137 ] Designing best-data-recovery.com requirement For this competition, Kaggle has provided real-world online casino datasets online casino that comprises approximately 4,00,000 training best-data-recovery.com points. drivers underlying China’s rapid growth over the past two decades, such as Friends Selena and justin-bieber-news.info and Selena, you agree, then parted, and in the end of last mobile casino year, the gap seemed to casino online be final, they can”t live without each other, and between them there is a strong casino spiele link. cheap labor and technology catch-up, are eventually exhausted.

However,   some commentators both inside and outside of China argue that many casino of the proposed economic reforms have little chance of succeeding without deeper political and institutional reform.  Beijing’s policy process casino pa natet currently favors the entrenched economic elite, which Find out how to apply for health buy-detox.com premium tax credits for cost-assistance on the ObamaCare Health Insurance Marketplace using our Health Insurance Marketplace Guide. benefits proportionately more from the current model of imbalanced growth.  Vested interests, particularly local governments and state-owned enterprises, oppose key elements of Chinese leaders’ economic reform agenda.  Furthermore, an expected decline in the growth of central-level revenues will likely undercut Beijing’s ability to compensate domestic constituencies on the losing end of any reforms.  To dilute the influence of these interests and create more momentum behind needed reforms, Beijing would need to broaden political participation in favor of lower-income citizens and make the policy process more open and transparent.

This suggests that China’s incoming leaders will increasingly be challenged to balance their desire to preserve the party’s monopoly on power against their interest in safeguarding China’s long-term economic development.  Depending on how Beijing manages these competing objectives, China might see a future in which it can no longer compete in low-wage industries but lacks the ability to move to higher value-added sectors, and the World Bank’s warning would become a reality.

Zachary Riskind is an analyst with the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group.

Hardly a month goes by without another book or article on whether this century will be Chinese, American, or a free for all. It is a frustrating debate. These arguments all rely heavily on past performance and future projections—especially crude metrics like GDP growth and military spending. They often predict how other states will behave decades into the future when we know from history that intentions can change both from the bottom up and top down.

There is a pre-season mentality to much of this debate. In the pre-season, sports fans and pundits look at past performance and recent trades to predict who will win the Superbowl or the World Series. It’s an entertaining exercise but the favorites usually lose. The season is too long, too contingent upon performance, tactics, and strategy, to be determined by a few basic metrics. One thing is certain: it would be a foolish manager who accepted the pre-season noise as truth.

Accurate long-term predictions about geopolitics are impossibleLarge Inflatable Slide. We have no idea if the 21st century will see the continuation of the American era, a Chinese century, or a multipolar balance of power. All of these scenarios are plausible but it is a mistake to argue that they are inevitable or even likely. The 20thcentury is proof that geopolitics is inherently surprising. Its outcome was contingent upon strategic decisions, ideas, accidents, and personalities. In 1912, it was not obvious that the next eight decades would be an age of extremes, dominated by ideological movements, punctuated by vast online casino canada industrial wars, and ultimately constrained by the threat of complete and mutual destruction. Nor was it obvious that the United States, a growing casino power whose people had little desire to seek global hegemony, would make the century Americaninflatable water park. There is no reason to believe that the human capacity for foresight has improved over time.

Consider then casino online why the 20th century became casino online known as the American century. Certainly, part of it had to do with projections of economic growth but, decade by decade, strategic planners got casino online the medium term future badly wrong. Other factors were crucial—particularly social and ideological online casino movements inside societies casino online and adaption to technological change. But perhaps most importantly, casino online the online casino struggle for mastery was influenced by the strategic decisions, in wartime and peacetime, casino online Overall, Jens is a great guy, knows the rules of the road, and preps you well for brooklyn driving online casino school day. taken in Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo, London, and Washington. The 20th century became the American century partly because the United States responded well to the challenges presented to it but also because other states did not do so well and made major dgfev online casino mistakes. So, it “won” the century. But it casino online was hardly preordained.

It’s easy to online casino engage in pre-season speculation about the future of U.S. power and the international order. But, ultimately it is a distraction. Understanding how the world is changing in terms of GDP growth is important but it’s not the same as understanding how the game of strategy is changing or how to play it. The real question that foreign policy experts must grapple with is this: how does the rise of the rest change the strategic competition for international influence Inflatable Zorb Balls.

There is little doubt that this will be a new strategic environment.  The United States is economically interdependent with its only potential great power competitor, China. That is new. America’s allies in Asia are increasingly dependent upon China for their economic growth even as they seek to deepen their security ties with the United States.  That is new. The United States will probably be more of a status quo power than it used to be. That too is fairly new.

These changes, and others, will transform how states compete in the coming decades. The state that masters these dynamics will have a much greater chance of coming out on top. For the United States this means understanding how the liberal international order must adapt and change. For others, it may mean something differentwater slides . But one thing is shared: the state that spends its time and energy building a crystal ball to pick the winner will probably lose.

Thomas Wright is a fellow at the Brookings Institution 

One topic that hasn’t received as much attention as it might is differential economic growth within China.  I’ve been perusing the First Quarter 2012 edition of the China Beige Book (http://www.chinabeigebook.com/), which offers a high-fidelity, comprehensive survey of current national, regional, and sectoral economic conditions in China.  It is based on original primary source sourced within and throughout the country.  What it reveals is some considerable differences in the economic climate between (and within) China’s various regions.  Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, for example, online casino canada have experienced strong revenue growth this quarter as casino online autos and IT have mobile casino been doing well, but Shanghai also has the most firms with falling online casino output.  In Interest in music from justin bieber songs lyrics movie was discovered when he casino online was only 2 years. the northeast, by contrast, manufacturing is plodding, hurt by sluggish textile and capital goods best online casino demand, but many domestic and foreign companies are still investing. In China’s central region, growth is disappointing and manufacturing results are lackluster, but the region is attracting an impressive set of local and foreign firms seeking untapped markets and cheap local labor. Farmers are hopeful but worried about drought.

Such regional differences have heretofore taken a back seat to high levels of economic growth.  One wonders if they will feature more prominently in decision making as Chinese economic growth slows.

Our assumptions about the future security environment depend heavily on assumptions about the growth of the Chinese economy.  Not too long ago, the orthodox view was that China’s high rate of growth would continue into the future.  This view was particularly pronounced best-horoscope.com and Capricorn men will also win your favours. in the wake of the 2008-09 global recession.  More casino recently, there has been a growing body of evidence and opinion to the effect that the Chinese casino spiele economy is slowing down.  This, in turn, could be the prelude to China assuming a more “normal” rate of growth, or even to a downturn in the Chinese economy.

It seems to me that each one of these scenarios has security implications, both positive and negative.  So which scenario is most likely?  And what are its implications?

By: William Burke-White

My last post examined three possible scenarios for the shape of the UN Security Council in 2030, suggesting that, but for the possibility of a lucky crisis, Security Council reform remains unlikely and that there is a real possibility that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council will wither considerably by 2030. This post seeks to instill a bit more optimism by considering the possible sources of global political leadership for Council reform and ways that existing stalemates might be broken to allow the kind of reform that would lead to what I termed the “Reform and Reinvigoration” scenario in that earlier post.

Part of the challenge of Security Council reform is the lack of global political leadership to drive such a process forward. Existing efforts for Council reform have stagnated, weighted down by UN bureaucratic process, divides among states contending for permanent membership, and an unwillingness of any current permanent members to champion a reform process. While states such as Brazil and India that have a possible claim to permanent seats on the Council invest significant political capital on the issue, they lack the global political influence needed to drive the issue forward and each potential new member has a regional competitor—Mexico or Pakistan, for example—ready to invest equivalent capital. As a result, such states are unlikely to have ability to break existing stalemates or find workable formulas for reform.

Beyond these contender states, there are really only two meaningful sources of political leadership for Security Council reform: the United States and Europe. Both the US and existing European member states have reasons for preferring the current shape of the Council and sitting on the sidelines of reform, but there is also a compelling logic for the US and Europe to show leadership on the issue. Moreover, collectively the US and Europe could find potential break-through solutions to existing logjams in a way that might make the “Reform and Reinvigoration” scenario viable.

Start with the US. Of course, the US benefits form current Council dynamics. The US veto ensures US interests are ultimately protected on the Council. Similarly, the US can usually muster the minimum additional 8 votes needed for a resolution to pass, assuming no other permanent members veto. Yet, the US also has a deeply vested interest in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the Security Council and, more generally, the post-World War II order, of which the Council sits at the heart. By acting sooner, rather than later, as a leader in Security Council reform, the US will be far better positioned to help define the shape and structure of the reformed Council that emerges. Moreover, by taking a clear leadership role, the US can shift the political costs of opposition to other Permanent Members of the Council who may, in fact, be more reluctant to support reform and who have been able to effectively hide behind the US on the issue. Ultimately, if and when the US is willing to the look at Council reform from a slightly longer time-horizon, the benefits of leadership on the issue are obvious.

Over the past few years, of course, the Obama Administration has shown some willingness to advance the issue. While maintaining redlines on questions such as the expansion of the veto and the total membership of any reformed Council, the US has explicitly backed India’s bid for a permanent seat and given support to Brazil’s claims. Yet, these statements – in the context of presidential trips to both countries—have not been backed by visible diplomatic efforts or by evident changes in approach either in New York or in national capitals. The time may well be ripe for more active US leadership. And while such leadership would certainly not lead to immediate reform, it would put the US in a far better political and diplomatic position to shape reform when and if it ultimately occurs.

The second possible source of global leadership on Security Council reform is Europe.  The logic for issue leadership from Europe is even more apparent than for the United States. Ultimately, Europe seeks three seats on a reformed Council – the existing French and British permanent seats and, presumably, one for Germany as well. In light of Europe’s economic woes, internal challenges, and reduced relative political influence, the longer Europe waits to lead on Council reform, the less likely it becomes that this three-seat goal can be achieved. In fact, the more time that passes before reform occurs, the less likely it is that both France and the UK can reasonably maintain their existing seats. For Europe, early Council reform is far better than Council reform in 2030.

The Europeans may also hold the key to breaking current logjams and finding a mutually acceptable formula for Council reform. Specifically, a key redline for the US is the maximum number of permanent members on any reformed Council. Too large a group and the US (among others), rightly fears that any consensus on the Council will become impossible. Yet, most formulas that would incorporate the new members necessary for the Council’s perceived long-term legitimacy quickly push against that numerical ceiling. What if the Europeans could reach an internal agreement on say two post-reform European seats? Such an agreement might involve, one seat for the EU itself and one that rotates among Germany, the UK, and France.

Admittedly, current political divides within Europe make such compromise seem far-fetched. But if Europe could reach such an agreement, the symbolic value of both internal European compromise on the issue and the slot that such an agreement would free-up might make real reform possible. In light of a European compromise, competitor states to those states with the strongest claims for new seats might have to relax their diplomatic postures. A promise of European magnanimity on the issue could well serve leverage to push for compromises among other contenders. And, of course, the third seat, to which Europe would, essentially, relinquish a claim could be used to enhance the broader legitimacy of the Council, while more easily staying within a fixed maximum number of members.

Perhaps this is a leap too far. Admittedly, the efforts to build a common European foreign policy through the new External Action Service have underperformed. And, while, Europe’s current financial woes seem to occupy all available diplomatic time and energy, a new European bargain (and perhaps identity) that might serve as the solution to the current economic crisis could well be the foundation for a broader political bargain within Europe that might include a new approach to the Council. Even if such an agreement is a stretch, it offers perhaps the best hope for protecting Europe’s long-term interests, finding the global leadership needed for Council reform, and identifying a workable formula for the inclusion of new permanent members. Should the Europeans reach such an agreement and the US be we willing to demonstrate real political commitment to reform, the “reform and reinvigoration” scenario discussed in my last post might not be unattainable.

My last post examined three possible scenarios for the shape of the UN Security Council in 2030, suggesting that, but for the possibility of a lucky crisis, Security Council reform remains unlikely and that there is a real possibility that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council will wither considerably by 2030. This post seeks to instill a bit more optimism by considering the possible sources of global political leadership for Council reform and ways that existing stalemates might be broken to allow the kind of reform that would lead to what I termed the “Reform and Reinvigoration” scenario in that earlier post.

Part of the challenge of Security Council reform is the lack of global political leadership to drive such a process forward. Existing efforts for Council reform have stagnated, weighted down by UN bureaucratic process, divides among states contending for permanent membership, and an unwillingness of any current permanent members to champion a reform process. While states such as Brazil and India that have a possible claim to permanent seats on the Council invest significant political capital on the issue, they lack the global political influence needed to drive the issue forward and each potential new member has a regional competitor—Mexico or Pakistan, for example—ready to invest equivalent capital. As a result, such states are unlikely to have ability to break existing stalemates or find workable formulas for reform.

Beyond these contender states, there are really only two meaningful sources of political leadership for Security Council reform: the United States and Europe. Both the US and existing European member states have reasons for preferring the current shape of the Council and sitting on the sidelines of reform, but there is also a compelling logic for the US and Europe to show leadership on the issue. Moreover, collectively the US and Europe could find potential break-through solutions to existing logjams in a way that might make the “Reform and Reinvigoration” scenario viable.

Start with the US. Of course, the US benefits form current Council dynamics. The US veto ensures US interests are ultimately protected on the Council. Similarly, the US can usually muster the minimum additional 8 votes needed for a resolution to pass, assuming no other permanent members veto. Yet, the US also has a deeply vested interest in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the Security Council and, more generally, the post-World War II order, of which the Council sits at the heart. By acting sooner, rather than later, as a leader in Security Council reform, the US will be far better positioned to help define the shape and structure of casino online the reformed Council that emerges. Moreover, by taking pokies online a clear leadership role, the US can shift the political costs of opposition to other Permanent Members of the Council who may, in fact, be more reluctant to support reform and who have been able to effectively hide behind the US on the issue. Ultimately, if and when inflatable water obstacle course the US is willing to the look at Council reform from a slightly longer time-horizon, the casino benefits of leadership on the issue are obvious.

Over the past few years, of course, casino online the Obama Administration has shown some willingness to advance the issue. While maintaining redlines online casino on questions such as the expansion of the veto and the total membership of any reformed Council, the online casinos US has explicitly backed India’s bid for a permanent seat and given support to Brazil’s claims. Yet, these statements – in the context of presidential trips to both countries—have not been backed by visible diplomatic efforts or by evident changes in approach either in New York or in national capitals. The time may well be ripe for more active US leadership. casino online And while such leadership would certainly not lead to immediate reform, it would put the US in a far better political and diplomatic position to shape reform when and if it ultimately occurs.

The second possible source of global leadership on Security Council reform is Europe.  The logic for issue leadership from Europe is even more apparent than for the United States. Ultimately, Europe seeks casino three seats Hive is a Hadoop-based hard drive repair warehousing like framework developed by Facebook. on a reformed Council – the existing French and British permanent seats and, presumably, one for Germany as well. In light of Europe’s economic woes, internal challenges, and reduced relative political influence, the longer Europe waits to lead on Council reform, the casino pa natet less likely it becomes it’s Goals Galore!Getting on our online casino superb enhanced Goals Galore coupons has never been so easy, with our mobile.the-best-casinos-online.info app available on iPhone and Android. that this three-seat goal can be achieved. In fact, the more time that passes before reform occurs, the less likely it is that both France and the UK can reasonably maintain their existing seats. For Europe, early Council reform is far better than Council reform in 2030.

The Europeans may also hold the key to breaking current logjams and finding a mutually acceptable formula for Council reform. Specifically, a key redline for the US is the maximum number of permanent members on any reformed Council. Too large a group and the US (among others), rightly fears that any consensus on the Council will become impossible. Yet, most formulas that would incorporate the new members necessary for the Council’s perceived long-term legitimacy quickly push against that numerical ceiling. What if the Europeans could reach an internal agreement on say two post-reform European seats? Such an agreement might involve, one seat for the EU itself and one that rotates among Germany, the UK, and France.

Admittedly, current political divides within Europe make such compromise seem far-fetched. But if Europe could reach such an agreement, the symbolic value of both internal European compromise on the issue and the slot that such an agreement would free-up might make real reform possible. In light of a European compromise, competitor states to those states with the strongest claims for new seats might have to relax their diplomatic postures. A promise of European magnanimity on the issue could well serve leverage to push for compromises among other contenders. And, of course, the third seat, to which Europe would, essentially, relinquish a claim could be used to enhance the broader legitimacy of the Council, while more easily staying within a fixed maximum number of membersWaterslides.

Perhaps this is a leap too far. Admittedly, the efforts to build a common European foreign policy through the new External Action Service have underperformed. And, while, Europe’s current financial woes seem to occupy all available diplomatic time and energy, a new European bargain (and perhaps identity) that might serve as the solution to the current economic crisis could well be the foundation for a broader political bargain within Europe that might include a new approach to the Council. Even if such an agreement is a stretch, it offers perhaps the best hope for protecting Europe’s long-term interests, finding the global leadership needed for Council reform, and identifying a workable formula for the inclusion of new permanent members. Should the Europeans reach such an agreement and the US be we willing to demonstrate real political commitment to reform, the “reform and reinvigoration” scenario discussed in my last post might not be unattainable.

By Mohan Malik

The Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy and the liberal democratic order is far more potent than that of the previous contenders, pretenders and challengers. Unlike the Soviet Union and Japan, China is not a uni-dimensional power but a multi-dimensional (economic, military, scientific and technological) superpower. Just as no great power goes quietly, no great power arrives quietly.

Rising powers are never status-quo powers. Whenever opportunity presents itself, rising powers flex their muscles and test influence. New players don’t play by the old rules. They seek to recast their region in their image. Their membership of the existing institutions changes the nature and role of the institutions themselves. In times of power transitions, rising powers seek to remake existing international systems.

China remains a non-status-quo power—in terms of territory, status and influence. Like other great powers in the past, China is also laying down new markers, drawing new lines in the land, water, sand and snow all around its periphery. Increased assertiveness signals transition from Deng Xiaoping’s strategic directive of “hiding capabilities to bide our time, and never taking the lead” to “seizing opportunities, taking the lead and showing off capabilities to shape others’ choices in China’s favor.”

China will behave as other great powers have behaved in history: it will carve out spheres of influence, establish a network of friends and allies to establish a pro-Beijing balance-of-power; secure access to natural resources, markets and bases; reform old and form new institutions; and establish a regional order that would serve Chinese interests and undermine those of its rivals. Power shifts have already created pressure for the reform of global institutions in which China, India and other emerging economies are not fully represented: the World Bank and the IMF and the UN Security Council. The exclusive G-7 has given way to the G-20. There has been a proliferation of regional and global organizations in sync with the re-configuration of power: APEC, ARF, APT, BRICS, IBSA, EAS, and ADMM 8.

China’s size, historical grievances, level of development, and nationalist aspirations dictate that Beijing only plays by Western rules when those are to its advantage. Chinese strategic writings indicate a preference for a unipolar Asia with China at the center of regional order and a multipolar world. Naturally, this makes it hard for China to accept any externally imposed barriers to its growth.

On a normative level, China’s growing global influence will empower it to lay down new rules for the post-American international order. Despite being the largest beneficiary of the existing international order, Beijing perceives it as a “tool” of the “imperialist West” that would “constrain China’s future growth.” Evidently, China appears increasingly uncomfortable with many of the laws and norms that undergird the current international system.

Most post-World War II institutions were built upon liberal-democratic norms such as respect for human rights, transparency, openness and inclusiveness. However, with wealthy authoritarian regimes now taking online casino the lead in establishing multilateral institutions, a very different set of norms would underpin international organizations. The SCO is one example of this new type of regional multilateral institutions which lack any democratic and liberal values.

As China’s power grows, Beijing will push for a new regional and global institutional architecture. Beijing’s policies on climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, world trade and UN Security Council reform are a sign of times to come. In commenting on the failure of the Copenhagen climate negotiations, the Chinese Ambassador for Climate Change, Yu Qingtai, drew the ominous lesson that “the developed countries need to make up their minds whether they want to pursue confrontation or co-operation with China.”

The financial aid and bailouts that China can offer to recession-hit countries surpass those of existing international financial institutions. China has shown willingness to use its growing financial influence in international institutions such as the ADB and the IMF to wield veto power over rescue packages for countries that do not comply with its political demands — especially over issues such as Tibet and Taiwan.

China’s diplomatic energies will remain focused on creating an alternative pole to democratic-liberal order in international institutions, eroding U.S. power, and driving a wedge between the United States and its allies. Luo Yuan, chairperson of the Strategy Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, believes that China will soon reach a stage where it will have the power to either mold or discard existing institutions and build a new political-economic international order that will ensure strategic balance and stability.

Critics suspect that this “new political-economic international order” would not be much different from the Sino-centric hierarchical order of pre-modern Asia. The Chinese certainly seem far more comfortable with multilateral forums they have constructed, like the SCO, in which China plays the leading role, than with existing global institutions that were created by the United States and its allies and reflect Western values. Given the central role that China plays in giving direction to the SCO, the manner in which the SCO has developed provides interesting clues to the direction other regional organizations, such as APT and EAS, might take should China assume a dominant position.

In many multilateral forums, Washington alone will not be able to set the agenda or shape desired outcomes on a range of traditional and transnational security issues. With growing global power, and an increasingly nationalistic public opinion at home, Beijing will seek to rewrite the rules on trade, currency, technology, intellectual property rights, navigation of the seas, water resources, and climate change to protect Chinese interests. China already operates both within and outside the international system, seeking to mold it to serve Chinese interests while at the same time, in effect, working to establish a new Sino-centric regional order. Beijing will use global norms and conventions and its growing clout in international organizations to promote China’s core interests or have its foreign policy agenda endorsed while defining limits to U.S. power and marginalizing Beijing’s Asian rivals (India and Japan).

Having said that, discord between “China and the rest” could still make the West prevail. China is a polarizing rising power. Among regional countries, China will continue to arouse unease because of its size, history, proximity, power, unresolved territorial/maritime disputes, and more importantly, because memories of the tributary state system have not dimmed. Despite its relative decline, the United States will remain the balancer of choice for most countries on China’s periphery and elsewhere.

In particular, the Sino-Indian relationship will be marked by a “positional” rivalry in multilateral forums—a concern over their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchy. With the notable exception of environment and some trade issues, there are not many issues of collaboration and cooperation between China and India. In fact, far from mitigating their power competition, regional and international organizations will become the new arenas of Sino-Indian rivalry for maximizing relative power and for gaining advantage and influence.

Mohan Malik is Professor in Asian Security at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu. His most recent book is China and India: Great Power Rivals (London and Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011). These are his personal views.