Migration would seem to one of the least promising areas for global governance, but factors might emerge out of left field in the period to 2030 that could improve the prospects.

Global governance of migration seems far off.  Trends are hard to determine, with flows driven by economic, demographic, security, climate-related and political push and pull factors.  Adverse consequences of migration are borne unevenly, and concerns about migration often involve dyads or groupings of sending and receiving countries, often with little national incentives to widen their issues to broader forums.  National approaches have tended to dominate, with states eager to protect their prerogatives, less than completely willing to admit deficiencies in enforcement or demand for labor for their informal economies.  Weak countries that incur adverse consequences have little clout with more powerful sending or receiving countries.  Countries that might lead global governance issues would have to contend with “glass house” issues before trying to induce others to collective action.  If all this were not enough, adverse consequences and the net outcome of costs and benefits are notoriously hard to measure.  For example, erosion of social cohesion as a consequence of migration is hard to weigh against benefits of labor migration.  It is unclear who will be the future advocates of global governance of migration, if there are any.  It may be the closest we collectively get is a spaghetti-like network of bilateral commitments, conventions on standards, and side deals.

Global governance perhaps has come farthest for human trafficking, but with its criminal dimension, this is only partially a migration issue.  Human trafficking may be unique in the traction it gets because of shared concern or compassion for victims.

All that said, some form of global governance of migration would be rational for nation-states, because of the prospect for overall improvement in economic performance, and cross-cutting human rights.  Perhaps the strongest argument is that migration shocks will inevitably come, and they could be cross-regional or global in scope.  Some form or efforts are global governance could provide a rehearsal stage for cooperation in times of migration shock. Shocks of sufficient magnitude could even kick global governance of migration forward, with the right set of actors involved.

One big open question concerns the sources of future advocacy for global governance of migration.  Who will the strongest advocates be and will they have some common backgrounds?  Of nation-states do not champion improved governance of migration, will others?

There could be an intersection with the trend in which there are many more cosmopolitans globally, with fewer and weaker attachments to nation-states?  Globally, we could see more citizenship a la carte,including dual citizenship, with extensive freedom of action for this special kind of migrant.  Some of these cosmopolitans will primarily have economic motivations and incentives.  They will have strong preferences for lifestyle residences, flexible citizenship, and venue shopping for attractive public finance and investment arrangements.  However, there also will normative cosmopolitans, with sophisticated insider critiques of both the West and of emerging economies, with nuanced interpretation of home countries challenges, including challenges and human costs of unregulated migration. The counter argument is that successful advocates of global migration would need strong roots in the domestic politics of major player countries to work.  Normative cosmopolitans would likely not, under today’s circumstances at least.

Robert O. is one of the Research Directors in the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group, with a portfolio covering governance, democratization, and migration.

Between now and 2030, urban conglomerations will likely continue to be magnets for migration, including continued internal rural-to-urban migration in the developing world, urban-to-urban migration of poor people between neighboring countries, and migration of people to cities in Europe, and in strong emerging economies. Migration could easily add to the stresses on urban governance that already exist.  Mega-cities will cover hundreds of square miles, with increasing complex mixing of socio-economic classes in concentric circles from city nuclei to vast urban peripheries. A few key questions come to mind on the intersection of urban growth and politics, and all three involve migrants.

Is the supply of institutions and leaders for urban governance likely to meet the demand?  Demand for sound urban governance is likely to be intense.  There will be a premium on problem-solving for resource management, including food and water security, environmental standards, and working across seams in law enforcement because of their critical importance to the welfare of urban dwellers, including many migrants.

Under the right circumstances, people in mega-cities are likely to take the initiative to supply sound urban governance. Many examples already exist of grass-roots innovation and creativity; in fact, within the territories of almost-failed states, the city and local governance structures are often the best organized and most competent.

However, the ability of cities to take such initiatives will likely be dependent on how they are able to navigate public finance and their abilities to draw revenues from economic activities in cities and not losing those revenues to higher levels of government or to patronage.   Cities will seek effective workarounds to tap the revenues from large informal economies in cities, and using those revenues to improve services.  This is bound to involve accounting for and incorporating large numbers of internal or international migrants, without challenging their presence or residency.  Geo-demographic mapping—facilitated by ICT, could enable good characterizations of urban residents and neighborhoods.  Will city residents come to have a sense of agency that catalyzes problem-solving or will survival instincts dominate?

Are people likely to work across jurisdictions or borders to improve urban governance?  Policy coherence or coordination among cities within a country could give them leverage against central governments. In some cases, people from cities in adjoining countries could have more in common than with co-citizens from elsewhere in their respective countries, potentially mediated by migrants with ties to several countries. Moreover, shared interests between urban actors and international actors, such as NGOs, could empower urban areas and motivate actions to improve problem-solving in mega-cities. While sovereignty barriers between countries could prevent coordinated actions or cross-learning, barriers could be overcome by the public demand for problem-solving and the cross-nation affinities of many urban-dwellers.  Will workarounds prevail?

Will urban migrant concentrations act as incubators for political change or emergence of political entrepreneurs? Concentrations of migrants could catalyze social mobilization among urban residents, including creative ways to harness informal economies or foster political decentralization. Rural to urban migration also has played a role in revolutions in places as historically diverse as 1848 Europe, 1978/79 Iran, and the 2011 Arab Awakening.  People in urban areas and their vast urban peripheries could have more exposure to economic inequalities, more incentive to shake the system, and more access to new ideas than their co-citizens. The presence of large numbers of migrants could facilitate contagion of ideas across cities in unexpected ways, including ideas for improved governance.  Can social and political mobilization occur in ways that avoid blaming migrants?

Robert O. is one of the Research Directors in the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group, with a portfolio covering governance, democratization, and migration.

The potential for persistent instability in North Africa, the Levant, and South Asia clearly has high stakes for Western Europe, for lots of reasons, but foremost because of the prospect for increased migration from Muslim-majority countries.  This trend will likely reshape Western European society and politics.

With low projected economic growth, Western Europe would have many challenges with current levels of immigrant flows and immigrant residents.  Assuming that Western European fertility remains at sub-replacement levels, countries can expect to experience a rapid shift in ethnic composition, particularly around urban areas. While Western Europe’s future of demographic aging and declines in its working-age population should enhance immigrants’ job opportunities, labor market and workplace policies could continue to dampen formal-sector job growth. When coupled with job discrimination and educational disadvantage, these factors will confine many immigrants to low-status, low-wage jobs, and result in deepening societal cleavages.

• The growing presence of Muslim communities in Western European countries has already triggered contentious debate over policies affecting human rights, group rights, education, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and the relationship between the state and religion.
• Despite a sizable stratum of integrated Muslims across Western Europe, a subset will increasingly identify with Muslim communities that are relatively closed to outsiders, valuing their separation as distinct communities, oriented toward Muslim-specific rights and privileges, with some driven by a sense of alienation, grievance and injustice.
• It may be that Western European governments, and political systems, could meet with limited success in managing integration of resident Muslims. Part of the challenge will likely be a surplus of policy goals—from mitigating radicalization to engendering adoption of shared values of tolerance and individual human rights, to respecting majority community values, and respecting minority community values. The skill and subtlety required to reconcile these diverse goals and implement programs with broad public support across multiple jurisdictions of government could well be beyond the capacity of most Western European states and their political systems.

Debates over Muslim-related social policies are almost certain to influence the structure and texture of the European political environment.  Even without increased levels of migration, Western Europeans face wrenching tasks of rewriting of social contracts and adaptation of political systems.  The presence of large Muslim minorities in Western Europe, as voters and as non-voting residents, will give these tasks a normative dimension that will hard to avoid.  It is a massive open question whether Europe’s rich and complex history of reconciling religion and the state will be a net hindrance or a net asset.

Robert O. is one of the Research Directors in the National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group, with a portfolio covering governance, democratization, and migration.